Western Balkans, Reforms and Eurointegrations by Maksimović, Marijana & Novaković, Nada
STRATEGIC STREAMS 2019: 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
PUBLISHED BY
Institute of Social Sciences
Belgrade 2020
PUBLISHER
Dr Goran Bašić
INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD 
Prof. Dr Armando Marques Guedes (University of Lisbon, Portugal)
Prof. Dr Steven Blockmans (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
Dr Goran Bašić (Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia)
Dr Milan Kankaraš (University of Defence of Republic of Serbia)
Dr Stanislav Raščan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia)
Dr Andrej Lepavcov (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia)
Doc. Dr Vladimir Bakrač (University of Montenegro)
Dr Srećko Đukić (Forum for International Relations of European Movement in Serbia)
Dr Ognjen Pribićević (Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia)
REVIEWERS
Prof. Dr Dejan Jović, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia 
Prof. Dr  Duško Lopandić, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Serbia, European 
Center for Peace and Development-University for Peace est. by United Nations 
Prof. Dr  Duško Dimitrijević, Institute of International Politics and Economics, 
Belgrade, Serbia 
SERIES
Edited Volumes
SERIES EDITOR 
Dr Natalija Mićunović
ISBN 978-86-7093-232-6
ed
it
ed
 v
o
lu
m
es
STRATEGIC STREAMS 2019: 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND 
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
EDITED BY
Dr Neven Cvetićanin 
Dr Andrei Radulescu 
Prof. Dr Jovo Ateljević
Institute of Social Sciences | Belgrade 2020
M
aksim
o
vic / N
o
vako
vic
76
MARIJANA MAKSIMOVIĆ
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade    
NADA NOVAKOVIĆ
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
77
  
Western Balkans, Reforms  
and Eurointegrations1
Abstract
The subject of this research is the processes of transition and reform in 
the Balkans and integration into the European Union (EU). These proce-
sses have their historical, political, economic, social causes and con-
sequences. The efforts and efforts to integrate the countries of the We-
stern Balkans (WB) into the European space are emphasized. The 
question is: can the Western Balkan countries help each other in further 
regional and European integration? The assumption is that the knowled-
ge and experience gained so far about the aforementioned integrations 
is poorly used, but that there are realistic social and economic assumpti-
ons to accelerate the reforms of these societies. The countries of the 
Western Balkans should learn from the positive experiences of EU mem-
ber states, but also adapt normative and other solutions to their own 
social circumstances.
Furthermore, the authors refer to the emergence and meaning of the 
term Western Balkans, which came to the limelight from the beginning 
of the 20th century, and revived in the last decade of the same century, 
when it is most commonly used to denote an atmosphere of intoleran-
ce, hatred, conflict, war and division. Such an atmosphere dominated 
the breakup of Yugoslavia and resulted in the warlike dissolution of so-
ciety and the common state. These processes are an obstacle to the re-
forms, democratization, economic progress and European integration 
of the Western Balkan countries. However, the intense work and desire 
for EU integration in recent years, in these countries, have contributed 
to making conflicts in the past a barrier to further development.
Keywords: European Union, Balkans, integration, peace, transition, rule 
of law
1    This work was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech-
nological Development of the Republic of Serbia [projects number 179038 
and 179039]. The projects were implemented by the Institute of Social Sci-
ences,Belgrade.
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Introduction
 The beginning of the transition of the Balkan countries, in lit-
erature, began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. From an economic 
and sociological point of view, major changes in the economic and 
social structure of the Balkan countries began before 1990, but 
have accelerated and deepened over the last three decades. 
During this time, both the international environment and the Euro-
pean Union itself were changing. Overall, the transition direction of 
these societies marks the transition from a self-governing / state 
socialist system to capitalism. The manner, pace, characteristics of 
the main entities that governed the society are different, but their 
strategic goals were as follows: to create a market economy, a 
multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law. For most of 
them, the strategic goal was to join the EU, but the pace of achiev-
ing this is different from country to country.
 How did Serbia move forward? The key point was that as 
“the country of the heavenly people finally descended to earth” 
and began to solve real problems. To look at the domestic and in-
ternational situation and position, which she began to work on her-
self, on her own changes, while recognizing weaknesses, ignorance 
and her own shortcomings. Then it was revealed how great the job 
was, and that it would not be done quickly or easily. In addition, the 
issue of inter-regional relations in the region has been raised, but 
also closer ties with all EU countries as well as non-EU countries 
such as the USA, China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, BRIXA countries and 
many Arabian countries. It was her own firm determination to de-
velop the country economically and for its citizens to live “like all 
the normal world”? She realized that no country can develop eco-
nomically with human resources that do not want to work and de-
velop, with young people being allowed to live in illusions, and 
youth is prone to it. When events are thus viewed, what does glo-
balization and the fall of the Berlin Wall have to do with it? Enough 
of this is the country itself, in ourselves. But it cannot be over-
looked that there have been various international pressures, for 
which there are many facts and evidence, about which much has 
been written. Wise Japanese once said, “50% are guilty of our own 
fault, and 50% of our own fault” (Shinici, 2013).
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The countries created by the breakup of the second SFR 
Yugoslavia are Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro (without Croatia because it is already in the EU, Slo-
venia although the former SFRY country is also in the EU, but it 
does not belong to this name because it is a country of central Eu-
rope) and Albania, today politically referred to as the Western 
Balkans.2 Albania belonged to a different type of real-socialism 
than the SFRY and was one of the least developed countries. De-
picting privatization of social / state property, de-industrializa-
tion, old and new economic and social inequalities and poverty of 
employees and other citizens, as well as lack of rule of law, along 
with old and new conflicts, are considered as the most important 
structural obstacles to the development and acceleration of Euro-
pean integration. In addition, the existence of corruption is an in-
direct indicator of the absence of the rule of law. However, re-
spect for rights and human freedoms are some of the most 
fundamental values  that the EU requires from future members. 
These are some of the factors that are essential for regional co-
operation and integration, without which the economic and social 
progress of these societies is difficult. However, the term “Bal-
kanization” is multi-layered and has different dimensions (eco-
nomic, historical, political, cultural). Mary Todorova wrote more 
about this and pointed to numerous stereotypes about the Bal-
kans. She also emphasized that since the 1990s it has gained pejo-
rative and ideological significance (Todorova, 2015: 22). The name 
was created after the Balkan wars at the beginning of the XX cen-
tury, and with the wars of the 1990s in this area it gained new 
content and importance. Its essence concerns the fragmentation 
of societies, separatism, division, aggravation of conflicts, the rise 
of nationalism, local and civil conflicts and wars, after which 
non-volatile societies and states emerge. This has led some au-
thors to point to disintegration processes in the EU (Brexit, for 
example), as a danger of the “Balkanization” syndrome of that 
community (Dedovic, 2017; Srncevic, 2012).
2   These countries and the people who live in them have much in common, 
though there is no talk of creating something that was the former SFR 
Yugoslavia. The name Western Balkans itself is more of a political name.
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The European Union and the Western Balkan countries
However, just after World War I, someone noticed that the 
“Eastern Question” was in fact a “Western Question”, so now the 
“Balkan Question” is more than ever a “European Question”. Since 
Thessaloniki in June 2003, the accession of the Western Balkan 
countries to the European Union has become a formal political 
commitment, although the EU itself has wanted enlargement to 
the east. However, it turns out that the big difference between 
Central Europe and the Western Balkans is that the WB lost ten 
years in the wars of the 1990s. However, with the end of the con-
flict and regime change in Serbia, the EU has become a key interna-
tional player in the Balkans. However, it must be noted that there is 
disagreement on the views of EU Member States with regard to re-
solving the Kosovo issue and recognizing Kosovo. In the Western 
Balkans, the Europeanization of society has been under way in the 
last two decades, though in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
the US continues to enjoy greater credibility than the EU. Also, Pu-
tin’s Russia, relying on Orthodox Serbs, tried to gain a major role in 
the Balkans in those same years. Putin’s visits to Serbia reinforce 
co-operation but also strengthen bilateral relations in the energy 
sector. Also, the factor of influence is Turkey, which wants to 
strengthen its influence in the Balkans again, working together 
with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia to overcome old animosities. Tur-
key’s policy cannot weaken the EU’s influence in the Balkans, as the 
EU helps countries in the region consolidate and tackle trade and 
communication issues. International relations are renewed, trade 
and links between companies also. When looking at Serbia, Mace-
donia and Montenegro, progress has been noted in economic re-
form and regional co-operation, although there are still “concerns” 
about the rule of law. However, the difference between the coun-
tries of Central Europe and the Western Balkans, apart from the 
time lag, is the issue of state building, defining borders, democratic 
consolidation, which will make it a sovereign state. Thus, the EU 
emerges as an effective factor in integration, a factor of restoring 
stabilization, as a factor of regaining the capacity for co-operation 
(which entails the question of building institutions and state capac-
ities to exercise the rule of law of all citizens of a country). The 
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proximity and involvement of EU Member States is useful as they 
can help mediate the Europeanization of the Western Balkan coun-
tries, thereby mediating the enlargement process automatically. 
However, the issue of the “Cypriot lesson” implies that the EU does 
not want to transmit state conflicts to its territory, but wants bilat-
eral conflicts resolved before integrating into the European space. 
Subsequently, other issues, such as the rule of law issues such as 
corruption and nepotism, are the focus. The main sources of these 
phenomena are the “legacy of socialism” - social capital in this case 
means corrupt networks to circumvent the law; “War economy” - 
bypassing the embargo on cooperation with organized crime; ‘Mar-
ket transitions - which are non-transparent and highly corrupt; and 
“the use of political employment” - to impose party goals as nation-
al (Rupnik, 2011: 19 - 27).
Nevertheless, the Western Balkan countries are connected 
by a long shared history and the organization of life in the same 
area. What these countries need now is integration of their neigh-
bors into a broader, European context. The countries of the West-
ern Balkans have a burdensome relationship with the problems 
that arose during the war of the 1990s, and especially with regard 
to the succession issues of displaced persons, although pressured 
by internal economic and political problems. However, regardless 
of the EU, Serbia had to embark on processes of reforming society 
and embracing European values. The EU’s role would only be to 
support these processes and to consolidate them. The will, the de-
cision, the reform must be the decision of Serbia, for its own sake. 
The countries of the Western Balkans, as well as the entire Balkan 
region, have one common dominant political goal, which is to be-
come part of the EU. This idea has brought progress in relations 
with one another, leaving conflicts behind, and showing a strong 
desire to normalize relations and life between WB countries. They 
should not miss this last chance (Kovacevic, 2010: 49–51).
However, the world is in deep change, the EU is changing, 
the US is changing, and Russia is changing, China is changing, other 
countries are changing, for example, Turkey, but also Serbia. What 
is the path to creative renewal and flourishing of Serbia? Does the 
US-Russia bidding for Serbia contribute to leaving the EU? Or per-
haps the most significant is that Serbia has taken a route with Paris 
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and Berlin and is moving at the speed of “modern trains”.3 (Pantel-
ic, 2010:73-75). “One world is disappearing, edited from one cen-
ter. A polycentric structure of the world is being born, instead of 
the clash of civilizations - the cooperation of civilizations, new rela-
tionships are emerging between globalism and the national struc-
ture of the world ”(Markovic, 2010: 13).
The European Union and its foreign policy in the process of 
its own transformation and/or evolution, must face two of the 
most important challenges, namely security and energy. Namely, 
the risk of production and use of weapons of mass destruction has 
become greater due to the efforts of individual countries to pro-
duce nuclear weapons. Thus, the EU conducted negotiations be-
tween Iran and North Korea at two levels, levels of dialogue and 
levels of pressure. In addition, the issue of energy security indicates 
that the EU does not want its citizens to pay for the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian dispute or for them to suffer gas shortages. Climate 
change, increasing natural disasters, and environmental degrada-
tion and conflicts over natural resources and warming the earth, on 
average, are 1.5% significant. For these reasons, the European 
Union is today a powerful global player in all fields of international 
politics, from economy, energy, diplomacy and defense. Because of 
its magnetic and soft power, it is today a civilian superpower with-
out which the United States can hardly meet key global challenges 
(Ejdus, 2010: 39 - 41). Many countries, such as the US, Japan, China, 
and the EU, have offered a reduction of around 25% of uncon-
trolled planet pollution. Countries also agreed that the participants 
in the Copenhagen summit, seeking to reduce their emissions by 
50% by 2050, from the 1999 level. The issue of protecting forests 
in Brazil that absorb 20% of carbon dioxide was also a particular is-
sue. The EU’s active work on protecting the environment from 
emissions of fossil fuels, protecting fossil fuel consumption, sug-
gests that it is “the only one with the rules, commitment and realis-
tic mechanisms to achieve those goals” (Ilić, 2010: 41–44 ).
The EU itself has had its crises. Specifically, the economic cri-
sis in the EU member states was caused by maladaptation to glo-
balization, and was further exacerbated by the 2008 global finan-
3   The two strongest EU countries are Germany and France (author’s re-
mark).
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cial crisis. Another type of crisis was the institutional crisis of EU 
identity in the adjustment process. So the political crisis. However, 
what is important for Serbia, and for all Western Balkan countries, 
which is seemingly unfavorable, has been the tightening of the cri-
teria for EU accession. The WB countries have problems of eco-
nomic underdevelopment, lack of rule of law, high corruption, or-
ganized crime, and a particularly critical issue for Serbia is the issue 
of Kosovo and Metohija. All these countries are undergoing a tran-
sition “from real Soviet-type socialism to Eurocapitalism” 
(Teokarovic, 2010: 53-55, 59).
The parties in power in Serbia, the SNS, the SPS and those of 
the opposition (DS) have united on the pro-European issue. Thus 
began the consolidation of democracy in Serbia. But one key issue 
that hampered Serbia’s economy was de-industrialization, massive 
job losses, declining foreign direct investment, long-standing inter-
est from the rich and influential, a phenomenon known as the “cap-
tive state”, the removal of regulations that hamper private busi-
ness development and prevent corruption and one general inability 
to respond to the situation and the demands of the times. It is only 
in the last year that some elements of improving the standard of 
living of the population can be seen, the unemployment rate is be-
low 10%, bad coordination within the government has been elimi-
nated, and the process of Serbia’s EU integration is accelerated. 
Thus, Serbia has taken a leading role in the region on many issues, 
such as the construction of the IT sector, the growth of FDI, and 
the rate of economic development. Military neutrality was pro-
claimed, the development of bilateral cooperation with China, Rus-
sia, Turkey, the development of regional relations with Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Albania. Today, Serbia has sixteen recognitions of Koso-
vo’s independence withdrawn and is actively working to make the 
world aware of Kosovo’s unjust secession, which was also illegal 
and which sets a precedent in international law (Teokarovic, 2011: 
61-62). Serbia faces many illogicalities, but it can be said that it has 
overcome many problems and is taking major steps forward. WB 
countries have small economies, and as Prof. dr. Domazet 4, they 
4   Oral presentation at the Conference “Peace and Democratic Multilateral-
ism”, 2019 ECPD, Belgrade.
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need a new model of economy, new development, new social reali-
ty, new democratic politics, new institutions and new ideas.
Today, the governments of the Western Balkan countries 
are led mainly by “moderate nationalists” whose task should be a 
reform process that will overcome the issues at stake in order to 
complete the process of joining the EU region. Thus, European re-
form is not viewed as something external, but as the homework of 
every 19th-century European democratic society. Furthermore, 
“the EU is committed to transposing its model of peace through in-
stitutionalized interdependence in the Balkans,” though in real 
terms, the delayed process of nation-building in these areas. These 
items are an obstacle to the development of these countries them-
selves. The development of national policies in the Western Balkan 
countries, which are territorially small, is important for themselves 
and for the EU (Rupnik, 2011: 28).
The people of the Balkans do not want to jeopardize their 
progress, they do not want to return to the old days of hatred and 
evil. The only way out of the crisis is that violence must be replaced 
by diplomacy, that is, negotiations that must be pragmatic and 
guarantee peace, in order to change the Balkans’ outlook. An era 
of mutual co-operation, but also co-operation with EU-led Western 
policies, is desirable. Serbia is today a major factor in stability in the 
Balkans, precisely because of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo.5 The EU is leading the final stages of transition in the 
Balkans, and Belgrade is particularly praised for having contributed 
to the rise of democracy, although the focus remains on practical 
economic and legal issues (Abramowitz, 2014: 174 - 177).
Nevertheless, the European Union is entering a new 
phase of political development, and should increasingly be 
viewed as a whole (Radovic, 2010: 61). To this end, the EU has 
developed a new European security strategy. “From a common 
vision to a joint action: implementing the EU’s global strategy” is 
in fact the catchphrase the EU launched when defining its “EU 
Foreign and Security Policy” (EUGS). It actually served as a 
springboard for the EU to raise the issue of further European in-
5   For example, Albania and Kosovo have the highest share of households 
in which one family member is employed in one of the EU Member States 
(Manchin, 2011: 165).
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tegration and the survival of its member states after the UK ref-
erendum. Many doubted that the EU would survive after Brexit. 
However, the EU was consolidating very quickly and rapidly mov-
ing towards security and defense changes, with the creation of a 
new EU Military Training Command Center. In addition, the EU 
seeks to remain a global power and become a security zone for 
its citizens, and is committed to peace and development world-
wide. Cooperation with the United Nations is very important be-
cause of climate change and sustainable development. Because 
in a world of great powers and constant global challenges, the 
EU can only survive as a community, because the largest markets 
in the world, its member states individually and collectively, in-
vest the most in development cooperation and only in that way 
can they effect change. The emphasis is also on preventing new 
wars, humanitarian disasters, refugee crises and seeking a new 
approach to crises. The constant conflicts in the world, the 
threat of terrorism affect the everyday life of ordinary citizens. 
What the EU insists on is cooperation with countries of origin 
and transit to better manage migratory flows, and a proposal to 
draw up a global treaty on refugees and migrants. The “whole of 
the EU” is that it is “global”, “security”, using other foreign poli-
cies such as enlargement, development and trade, migration, 
energy, climate, environment, culture. The implementation of 
the EUGS objectives entails a strong and united Union, with re-
spect for regional and geographical priorities. The EU has placed 
a particular focus on developing peace and respect for neigh-
borhood relations in the WB so that these societies can recover, 
adapt and respond to development and crisis challenges. The re-
silience of these countries strengthens EU financial support for 
their reforms, the fight against corruption, the improvement of 
public administration, the judiciary and support for civil society 
(www.eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/49750/eu-glob-
al-strategy---- year-1_en, date).
For these reasons, it is not surprising that when seeking sup-
port for a fresh start to the EU, Ursula von der Lajen took the West-
ern Balkans as her first point of presentation (www.telegraph,en/
news//politics/3126334-door-eu-open-to-west-balkan-fon-der-la-
jen-seeking-support-for-a-new-start-europe).
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Transition Characteristics: The Path from the Socialist  
to the Capitalist System and the Rule of Law
With the disintegration and disintegration of the SFRY and 
the Eastern bloc of the re-socialist countries, in the specific geopo-
litical international circumstances, each of the newly created states 
embarked on their own path of changing society. The processes of 
changing economic and social structure are marked by the term 
transition (Novakovic, 2017: 48-52). Controversies over its content 
do not end to this day, but the fact is that these changes have 
changed the entire social structure.
Tranzition of society
It was based on changes in ownership of the means of pro-
duction and then on the existing political, educational, health, so-
cial and cultural subsystems. This meant creating a new class and 
new layers of the structure of society, whose interests were woven 
into the concept of transition and privatization. The basis of the le-
gitimacy of government was also changing, and the old ideology 
gave way to (neo) liberal ideology. Instead of the ruling working 
class, the capitalist class is in the forefront with the transition. Also, 
work as an important social value is viewed in the context of profit, 
and resources are used purposefully. The one-party system was 
abandoned, in the name of the multi-party system, and state gov-
ernance of the economy and society was pushed to the sidelines. 
The state was given a new role, determined largely by the ideology 
of neoliberalism. The consequence of these phenomena is the dis-
solution and disappearance of the welfare state system, ie. materi-
al and social security of citizens based on socialist distribution. Ac-
cording to Branko Horvat, the average social standard of citizens of 
socialist Yugoslavia was above the level of some Western European 
countries6 (Horvat, 2002). The dynamics, manner and success of 
the transition of society were determined by the way in which the 
new states emerged and the earlier achieved level of social and 
6   Hence understanding why regrets of past times in certain sections of the 
population.
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economic development. The international factor became more and 
more important during and after the conflicts in the Balkans.
 A positive example of transition is Slovenia, which has eco-
nomic independence even though it is a small country. Slovenia has 
successfully transformed its economy. In the first years of market 
transition, there was a gap because there was a surplus of employ-
ees and the need for them was reduced (Maksimović, 2004: 143). 
Namely, Slovenia has a small domestic market, and it cannot 
achieve economic development without active foreign trade. The 
economy is open-ended, it has managed to retain the core sectors 
of business companies, the R&D sector, the banking sector. Until 
the global financial crisis of 2008, the country managed to keep fi-
nances well balanced, with a smaller deficit, external debt was low, 
and so were public debt. Its good economic results are supported 
by the international competitiveness that the Slovenians are partic-
ularly committed to. An additional strength is the application of de-
sign in industry (Yama, 2019: 135). Before 1990, Slovenia was the 
most developed republic of Yugoslavia in terms of GDP, and Mace-
donia belonged to the underdeveloped (Mihailović, 1993: 35). The 
former had a “small war” with the JNA, gained independence and 
reached the GDP level most rapidly since before the transition be-
gan (Torkar et al. 2018: 174-198). In 2004, she joined the EU. Mace-
donia avoided the Balkan wars of the 1990s, but not the processes 
of national conflicts and disintegration and instability. In Albania, 
there was no civil war, but the change of political elites in power 
was a relatively successful transition, so much so that they consid-
ered it to be the “leader of the Balkans”. It is well known that Alba-
nia has a number of customs barriers that it manages to protect its 
market. (Teleskovic, 2018). This is what it looked like at one point 
because Albania has had more successful economic development 
throughout the transition, which is only partly explained by the low 
starting base.
Furthermore, the transition concepts of the Balkan societies 
differed, but were dominated by two. The first is a “gradual or 
gradual” and the second a “fast or shock” transition. Slovenia (and 
Hungary) applied the former, and the above mentioned WB coun-
tries the second. Slovenia gradually implemented the reforms, re-
tained more elements of the old system and cautiously opened and 
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liberalized itself from the outside (Mencinger, 2002). Other coun-
tries practiced “shock” or rapid transition. At the core of this con-
cept is the so-called. Washington Consensus, the embodiment of 
the essence of neoliberal capitalist development (Bukvic, 2011). 
Thus, the dominant influence of the international financial institu-
tions that imposed it on the indebted Balkan countries was real-
ized. With all the danger of a simplified interpretation of the Wash-
ington Consensus, the following processes can be cited: rapid and 
universal privatization, liberalization of foreign trade and reduction 
of customs duties, and withdrawal of the state (deregulation) from 
the economy and the most important spheres of society. For politi-
cally deprived and economically impoverished countries of the WB, 
this has proven to be a pernicious model.
However, the views of researchers and others on the success 
of the transition of WB countries are different. As a rule, interna-
tional creditors consider it necessary, not fast enough, relatively 
successful, and most WB citizens are disappointed with the inci-
dence of mass poverty and unemployment (Sadiku, 2013; Šućur, 
2006: 237). There are other indicators of transition, such as the 
growth of public debt, the demographic breakdown of their societ-
ies, and the economic and other dependence of citizens and soci-
ety on foreign factors. Unfortunately, the lower classes and strata 
appeared, unjustifiably, and in recent times encouraged by new op-
portunities, ie. community life that threatens the security of em-
ployment, treatment, education and, in general, the safety of the 
individual and his or her family. The capitalist class and parts of the 
middle classes consider it successful, not slow enough, and would 
prefer, on behalf of European values  and at any cost, sometimes 
brutally to protect their interests by law. In practice, this is often 
far from the rule of law, which, among other things, implies the 
equality of all before the law. The EU institutions’ assessments of 
the reforms in the WB are particularly negative in the area of  the 
rule of law.
Unlike the mentioned countries, Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina had a civil war during the first five years of transition. BiH 
is still under international protectorate and is far from EU member-
ship. Serbia and Montenegro officially split in 2006. In the first de-
cade of transition, Serbia had UN sanctions and war events in its 
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territory, especially in 1999. Strategic decisions on how to move so-
ciety played the largest role in the ruling classes and their elites, 
which were intimately linked to international centers of economic, 
military and political power. It also defined the concept of transi-
tion of society as a whole.
Corruption as an indicator of the absence of the rule of law
Ever since Welstaff Peace and Sovereignty of States, the 
rule of law and developed rule of law have been achievements 
that characterize developed societies and one of the most import-
ant conditions to be fulfilled by countries seeking to join the EU 
(Maksimovic, Petrovic, 2017: 216). Looking at the transition and 
privatization flows in WB companies, it can be concluded that they 
have not yet reached this level of development. This is evidenced 
by numerous examples of violations of existing laws, the absence 
of institutions that protect the interests of all citizens, or the fre-
quent pressures and influences of the executive on the legislative 
and judicial branches. Building a rule of law in developed capitalist 
societies has been a long-term and decades-long process. In this, 
they are prevented not only by the historical, political and cultural 
heritage, but also by the relation of the basic classes in society. 
There was no social consensus among them about the form, pace 
and goals of society’s transition, or even the rule of law. The soci-
ety was changing rapidly, and the issues of reform and relations 
between the executive, judicial and legislative branches were de-
layed and slowly resolved. At the core of this are different class in-
terests, to which external pressure from EU institutions could ac-
celerate these processes. While the processes of the so-called the 
initial accumulation of capital and the creation of a new capitalist 
class were of no interest in passing firm and clear legislation that 
would treat all citizens equally. Advocates for such legislation, for 
example, come after the end of privatization and transition. The 
goal of the capitalist class is to protect acquired capital and 
wealth. By then, civic and business morale had already been seri-
ously impaired, and corruption had become widespread and al-
most systemic.
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According to Slobodan Vukovic, corruption is “a forced mar-
ket transaction in which, by violating the principle of impartiality, 
the unlawful use of social position and power for the sake of self, 
family and group power comes to the full” (Vuković, 2003: 10). It 
has become a widespread and common occurrence in Serbia. In our 
society, but also in the environment, it is present in almost all areas 
of society. Due to the underdeveloped rule of law, it was further 
encouraged. Studies on privatization have shown that state institu-
tions are susceptible to corruption, as well as to breaking the law 
(Maksimovic, 2013). They did this before, during and after the pri-
vatization of enterprises and institutions. Control by international 
institutions was absent or delayed and was detrimental to the in-
terests of workers (in assessing the value of the company, con-
trolling the implementation of the sales contract, disbursement of 
funds for the social program, continuation of production) (Nova-
kovic, 2013). Opinion polls show that citizens are among the most 
corrupt in labeling health, public administration, education, the ju-
diciary and healthcare. Healthcare bribe legalized in Serbia (Jer-
emic, 2019). Confidence in these systems is low and information 
from the media confirms that corruption is widespread in other so-
cieties in the region.
The poor legal order of society is also evidenced by the nu-
merous procedures initiated by citizens before international insti-
tutions and courts. Even court judgments in favor of citizens can-
not be enforced because they are the responsibility of the 
domestic authorities. On the other hand, a number of system laws 
have been adopted, which are formally in line with European stan-
dards, but are rarely rarely implemented or interpreted differently. 
The practice of passing such laws quickly, by urgent procedure and 
without a public hearing, has also become anomalous. Weak and 
conflicting unions and citizens’ representatives are powerless to 
withstand it. This was extensively reported by the media in the re-
form of labor and social legislation (labor law, pension system law). 
Failure to follow the legal procedure is just one example of the ab-
sence of the rule of law. Much more severe are the cases and the 
influence of the executive on the judicial authorities, when dis-
putes are delayed for years or end to the detriment of the citizens 
who initiated them. The deeper causes of such phenomena are the 
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“reforms” of the judiciary and the judiciary, carried out to the tune 
of the ruling or dominant coalition parties in power. The rule of law 
would benefit all citizens. Public and public administration would 
be more efficient, cheaper and more responsible. Each individual 
would be protected in the same way by the law and before the 
courts. Confidence in these institutions would increase, and the 
need for myth and corruption would be reduced to a tolerable 
measure. WB companies are still far from it, ie. the rule of law and 
the developed rule of law.
Privatization of social / state property
The privatization of social / state ownership of the means of 
production is simplified in the division between winners (new 
elites, owners of capital) and losers (working class, recipients of so-
cial assistance). Fundamentally, property relations are paramount 
to the character of the economic and social system, and any funda-
mental change in that essentially means a change in the nature of 
society. It depends on the character of the class in power and the 
place of subordinate classes and classes in the social division of la-
bor and in the creation and distribution of social power. During the 
transition, property relations were changing, and with them the 
class structure of society. Before the transition began, the views of 
Serbian citizens were divided between the western, market econo-
my and the self-governing Yugoslav economy. For the former, al-
most half of the respondents were 49.6% and for the latter 47%. 
This attitude was expressed by two-thirds of political and economic 
leaders (Mrksic, 1990: 14). Of course, at the beginning of the transi-
tion, the essence of privatization was not openly discussed, and so 
often the emergence of capitalist social relations was masked by 
the euphemism of “open society”, “entrepreneurial society” (Bolčić, 
1994). Privatization was practically completed in WB companies, 
and a new class structure was consolidated. “In short, some of the 
pipes of privatization are declaratively prominent, and in reality 
they have been achieved quite differently. The end result was the 
creation of a new capitalist class. The working class is systematical-
ly and permanently dispossessed, crushed, thrown into the poverty 
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zone and into the margins of society ” (Novakovic, 2017: 135). The 
ruling class and dominant political parties rarely publicly acknowl-
edge that there are relations between working class exploitation, 
the dominance of the interests of owners and representatives of 
capital, and the emergence of a new owner of capital-state. She is 
still the largest employer in these societies, but also the legislator. 
The interests of capital, including the state, are woven into both 
the concept of privatization and the basic systemic laws (on labor, 
employment, companies, for example). This is a characteristic of all 
WB countries. They are often brought under pressure from centers 
of financial power, on the pretext that it is in the name of Eurointe-
gration (IMF, World Bank, WTO). There was no serious and greater 
resistance from the citizens. They did not follow the experiences of 
the citizens of Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, for example regard-
ing liberalization, rapid privatization and borrowing from the IMF. 
Light borrowing and poor investment in development have 
brought most ZB companies into a group that is indebted and in-
creasingly dependent on global power centers.
Privatization in the former republics of Yugoslavia was con-
ducted from the change of laws, federal and individual republics, 
to the change of ownership of the means of production, and then 
it was regulated by new and often amended laws (Novakovic, 2017: 
103-107; Lojpur, 2018; Horvat, 2002; Čengić, 2000; Čučković, 2000). 
The result of the overall changes is that a market economy domi-
nated by the private sector has been created. The tertiary or 
growth of the services sector has also been carried out, with the 
secondary sector experiencing the greatest changes. Namely, be-
fore the transition he dominated, both in the creation of the GDB 
and in the overall employment. After the privatization, there was a 
massive de-industrialization, the disappearance of large develop-
ment companies and large industrial cities. The working class is 
therefore disintegrated. The massive job loss has further increased 
officially registered unemployment. “In a nutshell, deindustrializa-
tion led to the decay of most of the working class, as workers were 
left without jobs. Poverty, mass unemployment, greater exploita-
tion and social inequalities have arrived ”(Novakovic, 2016: 750). 
This is only partially mitigated by activities in the illegal or gray 
economy, which is relatively high in the Balkans after 2008 and is 
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persistently represented (Vujović et al, 2013). One of the import-
ant roles of the informal economy is the amelioration of social ten-
sions, greater social conflicts and the ability of the poorest citizens 
to mitigate their low material standard of living. Every country that 
joined the EU had to reduce this area to a tolerable level and re-
strict it by law.
Rapid privatization has created an economy in which most of 
the companies are privately owned, in which there is little and no 
legal restriction on monopolies, and foreign investors are favored 
over domestic ones. This is especially characteristic of Serbia. In ad-
dition to the sale of socially-owned enterprises, sales of public-
ly-owned enterprises, which are important for the quality of life of 
other citizens, have also come into play. In the final stage of privat-
ization, national resources (water sources, mines, etc.) were also 
sold, which seemingly additionally leads to the creation of a subsid-
iary. Privatization funds went mostly to the state budget and then 
to spending, not investment for job creation. State institutions that 
led and controlled privatization at the WB, such as agencies, were 
strongly influenced by the executive and foreign institutions (Be-
govic, 2005: 224; Obradovic, 2005: 534). The legal restrictions on 
their operation were relatively weak, which went to the detriment 
of employees of privatized companies. This is especially character-
istic in the final stages of privatization.
The goals and results of privatization at the WB are not sig-
nificantly different. In these countries, there is a lack of a single hu-
man resource management model. The fact is that transition coun-
tries and their economies have moved from a central 
administrative system to reforming countries with basic market 
principles. Realistically, it was also a way of transforming large and 
outdated industrial sectors (Maksimovic, 2004: 140). A market 
economy has been created, in which there are monopolies, unfair 
competition, state interventionism for the benefit of the capital-
ists, and it is far more developed than the EU. No new jobs have 
been created to alleviate high unemployment and stimulate eco-
nomic development. The proceeds from privatization are very 
small, sometimes below the level of annual remittances of citizens 
from abroad. There was also a lack of investment in innovation, re-
search and education in general. WB countries invest little in inno-
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vation, which indirectly contributes to the low competitiveness of 
the economy relative to others. (Krstic et al. 2016: 1035). The new 
private sector is fragmented, not sufficiently independent of the 
state, without the ability to accelerate faster development of the 
economy and society. Government subsidies are most often target-
ed at privileged domestic entrepreneurs and foreign multination-
als. A consequence of the neoliberal concept of transition is the ab-
sence of an independent economic and monetary policy. 
Democracy is not yet consolidated, and for it the presumption is 
the existence of a state (Linz et al. 1998: 35). This is increasingly be-
ing pointed out by EU representatives.
 The new capitalist class  
and the introduction of parliamentarism 
The new capitalist class in countries in transition is by its ori-
gin, education and the power of heterogeneous composition. It 
arose largely from the nomenclature (economic, military, intellec-
tual) of the former ruling and sole parties. Other sources of emer-
gence are the remnants of the former civic class, followed by pri-
vate and private sector entrepreneurs, people who made a fortune 
through the privatization process, but unfortunately war profiteers 
and speculators (Bolcic, 2006: 42; Bolcic, 2008: 82; Obradović, 
2017: 90; Novaković 2006: 129-152; Lazić 2014: 69-98; Sekulic et al, 
2000: 1; Cengic, 2000). Their primary interest is the creation and 
appropriation of profits, as quickly as possible enrichment and its 
legal protection. Opposite this capitalist class was the mass of la-
bor, dispossessed of means of production, peasantry, and middle 
classes. Their material and overall social position is significantly dif-
ferent, and conflicts between and within them are open and co-
vert, of lesser or greater intensity, depending on specific social and 
political circumstances. It is also a means of controlling the citizens 
who are the biggest losers in the transition, and who often vote in 
political elections for the parties who encourage it.
Changes in the political system boil down to the introduc-
tion of parliamentarism, in which the proportional system of elec-
tions is dominant (Djukanovic, 2006: 529). Political parties are 
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weakly socially entrenched and the state “weak” (Stojiljković, 2013: 
135). The findings of relevant research in this area lead to the con-
clusion that it is a weak democracy and an unstable system, in 
which political corruption is also present (Goati, 2016: 4-10; Stojil-
jković, 2013: 135). This is far from the set ideal and goal of the par-
liamentary system in developed EU societies. Indirect evidence is 
the occasional public outcry of citizens in the WB (some examples 
are BiH 2014, Albania 2018, Macedonia 2017 and 2018). Citizens 
have little confidence in the ruling elites. They are disappointed 
with their actions, political and civil liberties achieved, and especial-
ly the quality of life achieved. This can be a factor in the coming to 
power of parties that are against regional and wider integration of 
society, or an important brake on those who are able to get in and 
out more quickly and effectively in EU. Therefore, the incentives 
that the EU encourages economic and other societal reforms are 
important as a prerequisite for joining this community.
Poverty, economic and social inequalities
 Economic and social inequalities and poverty have become 
limiting factors in regional and European integration. The achieved 
level of development of WB countries during the transition is evi-
denced by inequalities in wages, distribution of total income, pov-
erty of citizens, as well as data on GDP growth, share of industry in 
its creation, amount of investments, indebtedness abroad, open 
and hidden unemployment and demographic structure of the pop-
ulation. GDP growth was slowed down at the beginning of the 
transition, ie. in the tenth decade of the twentieth century because 
of the so-called transition recessions (Marjanovic et al, 2019: 52-
56). The more successful countries outperformed it faster, while 
Serbia only began to recover after 2000. Of all WB countries, this 
recovery was the slowest in it (Begović, et al, 2005: 41 - 46). The 
2008 world economic crisis has further hampered the development 
of these societies. Unemployment in the region was high due to 
the completion of privatization, and in 2008 it increased further. 
Changes in the labor market should be such as to accompany the 
creation of occupations in line with market needs. Thus, investing 
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in on-the-job training is the greatest competitiveness and opportu-
nity for innovation. Modern societies are based on the “knowledge 
economy” (Maksimović, 2014: 167). Furthermore, the debts of the 
citizens and the state increased, so that the former republics of Yu-
goslavia had long exceeded the public debt of the country before 
its dissolution. Inequality in the distribution of income and in the 
size and patterns of household consumption has increased rapidly 
and strongly. The Gini coefficient has increased in all WB countries 
(Arandarenko et al, 2017). The income inequality measured by this 
coefficient has grown the fastest in Serbia. Layering has taken on a 
large scale, a relatively small elite of 5-10% of the richest citizens 
stands out, and the majority of the population is poor (Lazić, Cvejić, 
2014). In that sense, the situation in Macedonia and BiH is some-
what worse.
 Relatively low population activity and employment charac-
terize WB countries. It is far from the EU average. Mass unemploy-
ment is structural and is only partly mitigated by the mass depar-
ture of citizens from outside the country. In particular, there is a 
high unemployment rate for young people and those seeking long-
term employment. The problem of low activity of older working 
age persons is becoming more and more pronounced, which is be-
hind the EU member states (Eurostat, Unemployement statistics). 
Finally, each WB country has its own specificities, regional, political, 
cultural, religious and confessional particularities. They are often 
the cause of social tensions and conflicts, which is a disruptive fac-
tor in the development of both regional and wider integrations of 
society.
 Poverty in WB societies has become structural, as a normal 
and logical consequence of the emergence and functioning of capi-
talism (Wallerstein, 2016). One of the most important causes of 
poverty growth was the clumsily implemented privatization of so-
cial / state property. The second, no doubt, is an attempt to quickly 
realize the neoliberal concept of society transition. The third con-
cerns inherited problems, and only in the fourth place are the im-
pacts of the global economic crisis. The situation of poor citizens, 
for example, has not improved much during the transition of Serbia 
in the last ten years. Official statistics also testify to this (Mlade-
novic, 2017: 12-13). Many of them lost their jobs during privatiza-
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tion, or could not find regular employment for years. Otherwise, in 
times of economic growth and prosperity, the interests of the em-
ployer, employees and governments differ, and this is especially 
pronounced in times of crisis (Maksimović, 2014: 166). A significant 
category of “new poor” were also employed workers who did not 
receive rent or were occasional and insufficient for a decent life. 
They are often voters for political parties that use populist rhetoric 
(xenophobia, nationalism), and which is often directed against the 
European integration of society. This further slows down the stabi-
lization of the democratic order while fostering internal and exter-
nal tensions and social conflicts.
Instead of a conclusion 
The paper outlines the most important processes occurring 
in the EU and the WB. They highlighted current problems in the 
functioning of the EU and new initiatives in this regard. The EU has a 
special place in the changed world of political, economic and mili-
tary circumstances. New opportunities for EU functioning and its 
potential to encourage other countries to join it were also highlight-
ed. First and foremost, these are the Western Balkan countries.
The term Western Balkans came into being on specific social 
and historical occasions after the Balkan wars. It was later used less 
often to bring the wars back to political and other public attention 
with the wars during the breakup of the SFRY in the 1990s. Its es-
sence is to strengthen the nationalist and separatist movements, 
which led to the dissolution of the larger social and state communi-
ty. The breakup was not peaceful but through war conflicts, mass 
destruction and material and human loss. Subsequently, small, not 
sufficiently independent states emerged, highly conflict-ridden, 
burdened with the same problems, without greater potential to 
tolerate others, especially those with which wars were waged. The 
burden of the “past” bothers them to accelerate economic and so-
cial development in general, making it difficult for them to inte-
grate into the regional and wider environment.
The Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) have so far completed 
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the transition of society. They also ended the privatization of social 
/ state property over the means of production. Each of them had 
specific problems, which through the transition were solved or 
complicated (debts, unemployment, inequalities). They all accept-
ed the neoliberal concept of transition (Serbia after 2000), and the 
results are similar. This is exemplified in building a market econo-
my, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A capitalist class 
was created, linked to the global capitalist class and the world cen-
ters of economic, political and military power. The once nominally 
ruling working class was set apart. At the forefront is the interests 
of the capitalist class, which defends itself by all means, from law, 
corruption and bribery to open social conflicts and war events. Pri-
vatization was the material basis of this. The concept of transition 
and privatization were adopted under the pressure and control of 
foreign institutions. Its implementation has led to rapid and wide-
spread privatization of enterprises, massive job losses, reduced 
rents and socio-economic rights of employees, increased official 
unemployment, poverty, the informal economy, and a deteriora-
tion of the morale of individuals and social groups. Fragmentation 
and inequalities in the position of employees and other citizens in-
tensified during the transition of society. They have also become 
obstacles to the further progress of society, which through the 
transition has been de-industrialized, economically declining and fi-
nancially indebted. Inequalities in citizens’ political power are even 
greater than in the EU and in the pre-transition period.
The regional cooperation of the Western Balkan countries is 
a necessary prerequisite for their progress and integration into the 
EU. The changes taking place in the EU will largely determine the 
pace, manner, conditions and time of integration of these societies 
into the EU community of countries.
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